This collection of documents provide guidance on the hazard-resistant provisions in the building codes for property owners, engineers, design professionals, building codes officials, and the general public.
The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2023 contains analyses that are designed to highlight specified subject areas or provide other significant presentations of budget data that place the budget in perspective. This volume includes economic and accounting analyses, information on Federal receipts and collections, analyses of Federal spending, information on Federal borrowing and debt, baseline or current services estimates, and other technical presentations.
At Secretary Mayorkas’ direction, a cross-Departmental working group of senior officials conducted a comprehensive review of how to best prevent, detect, and respond to potential threats related to domestic violent extremism within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Secretary further emphasized that violent extremism “has no place at DHS”1 and directed the Department to “immediately begin a review of how to best prevent, detect, and respond to domestic violent extremism threats within DHS.” The recommendations in this report are a reflection of the groups findings. These recommendations are organized around the following five overarching areas: (1) establish baseline policies and guidance; (2) promote employee awareness; (3) enhance methods to identify and address violent extremist activity; (4) foster an integrated approach; and (5) ensure the protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
During unannounced inspections in August 2021 of four U.S. Border Patrol facilities in the San Diego sector, and two Office of Field Operationsports of entry, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Office of the Inspector General observed that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) generally operated in compliance with National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search (TEDS).
The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) piloted Rapid DNA technology to verify claimed parent-child relationships. ICE HSI implemented Rapid DNA testing at 11 locations across the southwest border. On 13 January 2020, the United States District Court, Southern District of California issued an order requiring DHS to test DNA before separating an adult and child based on concerns about the validity of a claimed parental relationship.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not ensure Puerto Rico effectively implemented the Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power Pilot Program following Hurricanes Irma and Maria in September 2017. The report contains two recommendations on actions the Federal Emergency Management Agency can take to enhance the program’s overall effectiveness.
This DHS Countering Human Trafficking Year in Review reports on select accomplishments and advancements made by U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) offces and components in the last fiscal year, 1 October 2020 through 30 September 2021. It includes links to additional informative resources that explain DHS’s countertrafficking operations, outreach, and other efforts.
This fifth annual report updates key information from the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) January 2021 report by examining the status of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) public-private partnership program agreements, including the purposes for which CBP used the funds and donations from these agreements in 2020 and 2021. GAO collected and analyzed information on any new Reimbursable Services Program (RSP) agreements, Donations Acceptance Program (DAP) agreements, and memorandums of understanding (MOUs) for both programs for 2020 and 2021, excluding those analyzed in GAO's January 2021 report. GAO also analyzed data on use of the programs and interviewed CBP officials to identify any significant changes to how the programs are administered.
The Secret Service Overtime Pay Extension Act includes a provision for the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to report on the extent of progress made by the Secret Service in implementing the panel's recommendations. This report addresses the progress that the Secret Service has made toward implementing the panel's recommendations. For this report, GAO reviewed relevant Secret Service planning and implementation documents, analyzed agency training data from fiscal years 2014 through 2020, and interviewed agency officials.
The U.S. nuclear enterprise comprises two portfolios managed by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). DOD and NNSA have begun implementing some processes to improve risk management within their respective nuclear portfolios. However, they have not established joint processes to periodically identify, analyze, and respond to risks that affect the joint U.S. nuclear enterprise, and report information about these risks to stakeholders. DOD and NNSA have interdependencies among their nuclear programs, including among the weapon and delivery platform systems of the strategic nuclear triad. These interdependencies may result in additional risks to individual program schedules and costs. Absent a risk management process for the joint enterprise, senior leaders may not be able to effectively manage risks, make informed resource decisions, or accept risks.