







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Featured in This Issue

Asking the Experts About Active Shooter Threats
By Catherine L. Feinman5

Think Tank Discussion: Active Shooter Situations
By International Association of Emergency Managers10

One Mission for Active Shooter Response: Saving Lives
By Richard Hunt12

Beyond Running, Hiding, and Fighting
By Aric Mutchnick16

Active Shooter School Preparedness: An Update
By Kay C. Goss19

Cambridge Police Introduce First-of-Its-Kind Trauma Training for Officers
By Paul Ames23

Protecting Civil Liberties for Suspicious Activity Reports
By Jerome H. Kahan26

The “Not If, But When” Fallacy: Active Shooter Preparedness
By Research Group at University of Maryland30

Saving Lives With Gunshot Technology
By Edward Jopeck33

Preparedness Perspective – Active Shooters & Lone Wolves
By Thomas J. Lockwood & Peter LaPorte35

About the Cover: Question: What does an active shooter look like and where do attacks occur? Answer: They look like anyone and can occur anywhere. Pictured on the cover: (top row) Seung-Hui Cho, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University; Nidal Hasan, Fort Hood military base in Texas; James Holmes, movie theater in Aurora, Colorado; (middle row) Aaron Alexis, Washington Navy Yard; Dylann Roof, church in Charleston, South Carolina; (bottom row) Mohammad Abdulazeez, military recruiting center in Chattanooga, Tennessee; Tashfeen Malik, social services center in San Bernardino, California; Omar Mateen, nightclub in Orlando, Florida.



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Asking the Experts About Active Shooter Threats

By Catherine L. Feinman

On 16 August 2016, David Mitchell, chief of police and director of public safety for the University of Maryland, led a roundtable discussion at the College Park campus on the topic of active shooters and lone wolves. This article summarizes that discussion, which addressed various topics related to active shooters, explosives, lone wolves, terrorism, and related mental health concerns.



According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, there were 200 active shooter incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2015. However, the threat is increasing, with the average of the last five years (17.6/year) being three times higher than that of the first five years (5.2/year). The active shooter training drill that led to a lockdown at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland on 30 June 2016 highlights many issues related to active shooters: training, situational awareness, lockdown procedures, interagency communication, and public information sharing.

Universities like the College Park campus of the University of Maryland are tasked with protecting tens of thousands of students and faculty on a daily basis. With 104 police officers, more than 400 cameras, and other security technology on campus, Chief David Mitchell and his team must be prepared to face traditional as well as active shooter threats. However, even efforts to protect students and staff are sometimes faced with resistance. For example, the campus's newest technology, which is installed but not yet operational, has received mixed public reaction. However, Mitchell explained how shaving even just two minutes off response times for a 12-minute incident can save lives.

Early Lessons Learned From Orlando & Dallas Attacks

In the first part of the discussion, participants addressed how recent incidents like the shootings in Orlando, Florida, and Dallas, Texas, reinforce lessons learned, validate assumptions, or change thoughts. Some issues that participants have addressed within their organizations include: updating procedures for checking backpacks or not allowing backpacks; identifying which tools police officers have at the ready; determining engagement tactics (even when not fully equipped); working with emergency medical services in the warm zone; and engaging the public in educational outreach efforts, which include self-aid and medical aid to others.

In many active shooter incidents, more people can be saved with faster response and better training for first responders as well as bystanders. Citizens have proven that they are often willing to do something, but participants questioned what type of training is needed beyond running, hiding, and fighting. Although lockdown is important, some participants agreed that a lockdown approach must be unlearned in some situations, with clear exit strategies being implemented and exercised in advance. Each incident is unique and, unfortunately, as one participant pointed out, "You can't save everyone." As such, developing protocols and procedures that are venue-specific help businesses and schools

better prepare by creating barriers between attackers and potential victims, identifying escape routes, and staying one step ahead of the threat.

As facilities like schools become harder targets, attackers will shift their focus to softer targets such as commerce buildings. However, even hard targets should be careful not to fall into the trap of developing a false sense of security. Two shootings at Fort Hood in 2009 and 2014 demonstrated that even hard targets have some vulnerability. Situational awareness at all times and at all locations is critical, especially as time lapses between incidents and people become more lax.

The Current & Emerging Threat Environment

The importance of trainings and exercises cannot be understated when preparing for current and emerging threats in a changing environment. Mitchell explained the challenges that a new subway line through the middle of campus poses both above and below ground: staffing, evacuation, training about the third rail, radio operability in tunnels, cyber concerns, power failures, etc. Something as innocent as the game Pokemon Go, which is not a threat in itself, serves as a magnet for threats that campus police have had to guard against.

Social media has become an integral factor for any emergency in modern society. It can provide valuable information about the incident or even influence the outcome – for good or bad. Whether identifying potential threats or safeguarding potential targets, agencies need staff who know how to monitor social media sites, analyze the data, and share critical information about possible threats with relevant agencies and organizations. By developing plans, determining pause or freeze points in an incident, and identifying patterns, responders are better equipped to provide fluid responses. Gauging the threat picture is challenging and requires internal vigilance to identify telltale signs and red flags, which can stem from internal and external factors.

Mental Health Considerations

Dr. Jack Leeb, police and public safety psychologist, began the second half of the roundtable with a discussion on active shooter mentality. He stated that, in a traditional sense (not terrorism), active shooters tend to be loners and often have family problems, but many go unreported. Issues stem from diffusion of responsibility: assuming that others will report; or not wanting to get friends or family in trouble. However, anyone can play a key role by practicing situational awareness and sharing preparedness messages in homes, schools, and offices. Following an active shooter incident, critical incident decompression is effective and especially important after a mass casualty incident.

Leeb reported that feelings of guilt and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) decrease proportionately with increases in situational awareness. Looking for specific signs and reporting suspicious behavior can help prevent attacks and reduce psychological trauma. Parents should supervise the use of outlets such as Facebook and, with help from teachers and other responsible adults, teach their children about situational awareness for an online presence.

Unfortunately, cultural changes in the family dynamic present new challenges: families do not communicate as much; technology is introduced at early ages; and parents place greater dependence on schools to teach their kids. With 24/7 news coverage and internet access,

PTSD symptoms can be extended beyond those directly involved in an incident. The first step is to educate users through age-appropriate discussions and learning opportunities.

Role of New Technology

Some technological protection against active shooter threats may present legal and ethical issues of privacy. For example, suppression technology can be used to shut down communication for attackers, but can cause law enforcement to lose intelligence from or hinder situational awareness of those in danger at the scene. The balance between security and privacy can be difficult because society often does not trust what happens with information after it is collected. Interestingly, many people allow companies to collect and share data that they would not share with the government or law enforcement authorities.

Mitchell recommends that law enforcement agencies teach the message, “See something, say something, and we’ll do something.” He further stated that police departments risk losing their legitimacy when the public is reluctant to engage with police because it is not politically correct or they believe the police are the enemy. He recommends getting back to the basics of police-community trust by engaging and listening to the public through face-to-face interaction. Rather than hiding failures, they should be addressed and used as a learning experience.

As law enforcement efforts shift toward prevention, one participant suggested sharing accounts of near misses, incidents that were thwarted. Technologies such as gunshot detection and access control can assist in such prevention efforts by alerting potential targets and blocking access to attackers. The use of indoor gunshot detection systems was discussed as a new way to improve both police response and civilian evacuation. Without automated detection, effective responses remain limited by a reliance solely on the victims for early detection, alerting of police, and determining whether a run, hide, or fight response is most appropriate.

Implementation of any technology, though, should be integrated with a human element. For example, exercising and training personnel is necessary, especially when introducing new technology. Engaging the faith-based community is powerful because engaged ministers have been known to diffuse potential riot issues and provide support following active shooter incidents. Working with the right decision makers ensures a better understanding of available resources, technologies that exist, and best practices.

One participant described the private sector’s growing realization that it has duty-of-care obligations and, therefore, must take steps to mitigate potential threats. Frontline civilians can be empowered through active shooter trainings, which can be funded through insurance companies in the private sector, to delay the shooters while informing law enforcement. Technology automates some actions, but more needs to be done with regard to technology such as detection and diagnostic tools as well as information sharing. With effective use of technology and human components in an active shooter incident, emergency planners are able to take disparate information and put all the pieces together.

Key Takeaways & Recommendations

- Develop standards across departments for using new technologies in the law enforcement arena.
- Identify indicators and trends before an event, response issues during an event, and long-term psychological concerns after an event.
- Protect information and technologies from cyberthreats.
- Change attitudes to get people to recognize threats and their levels of risk.
- Use threats and incidents to leverage technologies.
- Unify public messaging for consistency.
- Harden buildings and facilities.
- Incorporate capabilities into daily operations.
- Engage the younger generation.
- Profile behaviors rather than demographics.
- Increase public awareness.
- Leverage the private sector as an effective tool.
- Adjust with cultural changes to gain public buy-in and increase situational awareness.
- Take advantage of funding opportunities available before and after a crisis.
- Recognize that even a 10-percent solution is better than no solution.
- Balance technology with human aspects to facilitate the decision-making process.

In This Issue

Drills, exercises, trainings, and education can be used in different ways to promote community preparedness and resilience when faced with threats such as active shooters. Stephen Maloney, Michelle Rosinski, and Anthony Vivino emphasize the importance of first determining realistic threat levels to develop an effective resilience strategy. Once risks and threats are determined, various stakeholders can take steps to prepare and protect their facilities. Kay Goss shares an update on school preparedness efforts for active shooters, whereas Aric Mutchnick addresses liability issues for businesses to consider.

Suspicious activity reports as discussed by Jerome Kahan can help thwart some attacks, but citizens must be prepared to respond when an attack does occur. For example, citizens can learn how to stop the bleeding before medical services arrive through programs like the one described by Richard Hunt. Edward Jopeck explains how gunshot technology in buildings can save lives. Peter LaPorte and Thomas Lockwood look at how to close existing vulnerability gaps using various drills and exercises.

For any critical incident involving trauma, discussion to promote an understanding of both the citizens' and responders' perspectives can help communities heal faster. Paul Ames shares how this is being done in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to help police officers better serve their communities. Groups such as the International Association of Emergency Managers

(IAEM) further such discussions with its Think Tanks, which are facilitated by Richard Serino. IAEM just released an audio recording of its latest discussion on active shooters. Anyone could potentially face an attacker at some point in his or her life. Minimizing risks and threats before an attack, knowing what to do during an attack, and promoting resilience after an attack are responsibilities that are shared among all community members.

Special thanks to the following writers, sponsors, and panel participants who made this issue possible:

Paul Ames, Deputy Superintendent, Cambridge Police Department

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Kay Goss, President, World Disaster Management

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William O. Jackson Jr., Emergency Preparedness & Response Specialist, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Integrated Resiliency Programs

Edward Jopeck, Business Manager, Battelle, Critical Infrastructure Security & Resilience

Jerome H. Kahan, Independent Analyst, National and Homeland Security Issues

Peter LaPorte, Independent Consultant, Homeland Security and Emergency Management field

Jim LeBlanc, Senior Advisor, Experior Group Inc.

Jack Leeb, PsyD, Police and Public Safety Psychologist

Thomas Lockwood, Cybersecurity Working Group, Preparedness Leadership Council LLC

Stephen Maloney, Emergency Preparedness & Response Specialist, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Integrated Resiliency Programs

David McMillan, Emergency Management, Baltimore Mayor's Office of Emergency Management

David Mitchell, Chief of Police and Director of Public Safety, University of Maryland

George A. Morgan, Training & Compliance Officer, Community Rescue Services, Hagerstown, Maryland

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Andrew Mushi, Software Quality Assurance Manager, CapWIN

Aric Mutchnick, President, Experior Group Inc.

Heriberto Rivera, Emergency Management Specialist, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF)

Michelle Rosinski, Strategic Communications Intern, Stratacomm LLC

Richard Serino, Distinguished Visiting Faculty, National Preparedness Leadership Initiative, Harvard University

Marvin Thomas, CapWiN

Anthony Vivino, Student, University of Maryland

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Think Tank Discussion: Active Shooter Situations

With the rise in active shooter or threat incidents around the world, it is important to discuss emergency management's role in not only preparing communities but responding to and recovering from events. Active shooter situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly. The International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) Think Tank on 17 October 2016 focused on active shooter situations from the emergency management perspective. The event was held at the IAEM Annual Conference, with over 250 people attending in person, many on the webinar, and even more over the phone. This discussion has reached over 66,000 accounts on Twitter and has had over 500,000 Twitter impressions. The Think Tank panel was facilitated by Rich Serino and the panel of speakers included:

Kathryn Brinsfield, MD, MPH, Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs and Chief Medical Office, Office of Health Affairs, Department of Homeland Security

Gregory Brunelle, Vice President of Emergency Management and Community Resilience, Tetra Tech

James Caesar, Emergency Manager, University of California, Santa Barbara

John C. Luther, Director, Washington County (Arkansas) Department of Emergency Management/911 Operations

Ray Mollers, Emergency Medical Services Program Manager, Office of Health Affairs, Department of Homeland Security

To listen to the recording from this Think Tank, visit <https://youtu.be/1XdbfR03wkk>

Please tweet using #IAEMThinkTank to continue the conversation.




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One Mission for Active Shooter Response: Saving Lives

By Richard C. Hunt

Law enforcement and healthcare organizations – including emergency medical services (EMS), trauma centers, and other hospitals – have a common mission in active shooter attacks: saving lives. Law enforcement stops the shooter, healthcare stops the bleeding, but both must work together to ensure early access to victims and their rapid evacuation.



This article describes the importance of: (a) engaging the public in lifesaving bleeding control; and (b) promoting cross-discipline collaboration and coordination among law enforcement, EMS, trauma centers, and other hospitals. Law enforcement has made significant strides in learning how to prevent and respond to active shooter incidents, which include: adapting tactics based on prior active shooter responses, collaborating with EMS, training on hemorrhage control, and equipping officers with individual first aid kits that include tourniquets. Similarly, healthcare organizations have made substantial progress in planning and training for active shooter response, and in using evidence-based lessons learned from the military’s experience in hemorrhage control that have saved lives.

An Emergent Care Solution

Severe uncontrolled bleeding can kill within minutes – potentially before trained EMS or law enforcement professionals arrive. Thus, lifesaving interventions by members of the public or of just arriving law enforcement officers may be the difference between life and death for survivors of active shooter attacks. The White House “Stop the Bleed” initiative provides the public with basic tools and information on the simple steps they can take to stop life-threatening bleeding. “[Stop the Bleed](#)” has the following goals: (a) the general public will know the phrase “Stop the Bleed” and its associated logo; (b) the general public will know how to stop life-threatening bleeding; (c) the general public will have access to effective personal bleeding control kits; (d) the general public will have access to effective public access bleeding control kits; and (e) every bleeding control kit will provide “just-in-time” audio and visual training.

Substantial efforts are underway in support of the “Stop the Bleed” initiative. For example, the Washington Post published a story that included an [infographic](#) on how to use a tourniquet. The University of Georgia has placed 240 bleeding control kits adjacent to their automatic external defibrillators (AED) on campus; the University plays a “Stop the Bleed” public service announcement featuring their team coaches and stars at their sporting events. Charlotte International Airport has installed public access bleeding control kits next to all their AEDs. Current and future leadership from law enforcement and healthcare organizations to support “Stop the Bleed” will put lifesaving tools in the hands of those who may have the best chance to save a life – the general public. Hopefully in the near future the public will have at least the same access to bleeding control kits with tourniquets as they do to AEDs in public venues.

In support of their common mission to save lives, law enforcement and EMS are planning, training, and exercising together for active shooter responses in many areas. But there is much work left to do – many jurisdictions do not train and exercise together for these events, potentially imperiling both victims and responders due to delays establishing safe victim access. Much of the focus of law enforcement and EMS on active shooter attacks has been on what happens at the scene of active shooter incidents.



Source: Department of Defense (2016).

Critical Triage Decisions

Deciding which victims of active shooter attacks go to which hospitals can be life or death decisions. On a daily basis, EMS cares for gunshot wound patients on the scene and during transport, and they make decisions on which trauma center or other hospital those patients should go to. Research has demonstrated that these decisions are critical – a 25-percent reduction in mortality for severely injured adult patients who received care at a Level I trauma center rather than at a non-trauma center – the key is to not overwhelm a single trauma center during a mass casualty event when other appropriate options are available.

The transport of victims from the scene of a shooting may include both the formal use of EMS transport, as well as the movement of victims by public responders in personal vehicles. More recently, law enforcement transport of injured patients has emerged as an accepted practice in some locales for daily occurring incidents. Law enforcement may be able to transport severely injured patients to hospitals faster than EMS, which may lead to better chances of survival in some circumstances because of the reduction in time from injury to lifesaving surgical intervention. At the same time, these transports usually occur outside the EMS process and without the medical knowledge that drives appropriate triage decisions. Further, they should only occur when they do not dilute the law enforcement resources necessary to ensure scene access and security.

The large numbers of victims simultaneously requiring care at a trauma center or hospital may exceed immediately available EMS transport capacity. For some active shooter incidents, there simply have not been enough ambulances on the scene that can transport enough survivors fast enough to lifesaving care. Thus, the decision by law enforcement to transport survivors from the scene to a trauma center or other hospital has clearly supported the mission – saving lives. Although this may be considered an atypical response role, such an initiative has likely saved lives.

In future events, it would not be a surprise if the demand for immediate transport of survivors to trauma centers or other hospitals exceeded the capacity of EMS. Contingency plans should be in place for these situations, which may include law enforcement, early mutual aid assignments to multi-victim shooting incidents, mass casualty transport vehicles, and even private transport. Rapid clearance of the scene is important not only to offer victims the best chance of survival but also because the safety of these scenes may be dynamic due to the risk of secondary devices and attacks. Expectations during a mass casualty incident should be clear among disciplines and good incident communications ensured.

With the already realized and future potential for active shooter attacks with large numbers of victims, it is important for law enforcement to have awareness of who does and who does not emergently need surgery at a trauma center. In a mass casualty incident, a life-threatening gunshot wound to the chest needs to go to the operating room at a trauma center; a non-life-threatening gunshot wound to the foot may be cared for, at least initially, at a non-trauma center. Having too many non-life-threatening injuries arriving at the nearest trauma center may compromise its ability to care for those who really need it. Bringing hospitals and trauma centers into the active shooter preparedness collaboration between EMS and law enforcement can help make sure the right survivors get to the right trauma center or other hospital as rapidly as possible.

Unique Requirements

Trauma centers and other hospitals also need to train on the unique requirements that mass violence events present. The operating room, equipment and supplies, and personnel resources are unique, in that many victims may need immediate surgery and may consume large quantities of resources including blood products. Secondary devices and attacks at the hospital are also possible and must be prepared for.

In addition, EMS, trauma centers, and other hospitals may be able to support training for law enforcement on how to stop life-threatening bleeding. Planning, training, and exercises for active shooter incidents that integrate all components of the response – law enforcement, EMS, trauma centers, and other hospitals – support the mission they all have in common: saving lives. Collaboration between law enforcement and healthcare may be facilitated by healthcare coalitions reaching out to law enforcement and vice versa; state and local health departments should be able to help connect local law enforcement agencies with the closest healthcare coalition.

In summary, the synergies among law enforcement, EMS, trauma centers, and other hospitals can save lives from active shooter attacks. By supporting the “Stop the Bleed” initiative, all law enforcement and healthcare organizations can provide lifesaving skills to those who may have the best chance to save a life during an active shooter incident – the general public. By planning, training, exercising, and responding together, law enforcement, EMS, trauma centers, and other hospitals will help improve survival from active shooter attacks. Opportunities to improve the chances of saving lives should not be missed. It is a joint mission.

Richard C. Hunt, MD, FACEP, is senior medical advisor for the National Healthcare Preparedness Programs in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. He was director for medical and public health preparedness and response, National Security Council Staff, The White House from 2013 to 2015. At the White House, he played a critical role in the response to the Ebola crisis and led the "Stop the Bleed" initiative. Prior to his positions in Washington, he was distinguished consultant and director of the Division of Injury Response at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Injury Center. Prior to federal service, he served as professor and chair of the Department of Emergency Medicine at State University of New York Upstate Medical University in Syracuse, New York. He is a past president of the National Association of EMS Physicians. He is a diplomate of the American Board of Emergency Medicine, is an adjunct professor of emergency medicine at Emory University School of Medicine, and holds a Master of Science degree. He has authored over 60 peer-reviewed papers, multiple book chapters, and federal reports.

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
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Beyond Running, Hiding, and Fighting

By Aric Mutchnick

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's "Run. Hide. Fight.®" model serves as the foundation for active shooter preparedness. However, it does not address the needs of those with liability and duty-of-care concerns who must manage an event and minimize casualties before police arrive. A new approach to active shooter training has identified an almost untouched aspect of active attacker response.



There are ample statistics that demonstrate how pervasive the active attacker/workplace violence issue has become, both domestically and internationally. Thus far, the strategy for dealing with these events has been centered on the Run.Hide.Fight. model for the civilian population, which is a great methodology on an individual level. The overall strategy has focused on the needs of arriving law enforcement and emergency responders. However, the gap in this strategy is how to manage the time between the arrival of the attacker and the arrival of law enforcement.

Understanding Site-Specific Factors

Management and security staff in any facility, especially those who are unarmed, must consider whether to run, hide, or fight on an individual level, but this is only the first step. In some cases, law enforcement may not be able to arrive sooner than 10 to 15 minutes, or longer, so facility/site management staff must develop policies and procedures that best serve personnel on site. It is critical that these policies are site specific as every location is different. Even the type of attack may be dependent on the location. The issues of a school are not the issues of a hospital, are not the issues of a commercial building, and so on.

Additionally, those who have liability concerns in any facility must address the inevitable legal action that will be taken after any active attacker incident. Demonstrating additional duty of care by addressing the management of an active attack event can substantially affect the outcome of a settlement. Developing policies for managing an armed event also helps to support a culture of awareness in a facility that demonstrates increased duty of care.

The key elements to developing management procedures for an active attacker event include safety, communication, and control. Pertinent examples from actual active shooter drills are included after a description of each element.

Safety

It is important to determine how quickly management staff can move to a safe position. This differs from the Run.Hide.Fight. model, as the goal is to reach a safe destination where managers/security can still be operational. This could be a pre-identified command center or another area with limited accessibility to non-management staff. Every facility has unique aspects that must be considered.

Example: Many commercial buildings have fire control rooms. These are typically located close to the security/concierge desk. The rooms have no windows, lock from the inside, and have several forms of communication available. This includes a public address (PA) system that would allow facility managers or security personnel to provide instructions to building occupants.

Communication

This is, by far, the most critical aspect of managing an active attacker event. Once management staff and/or security have reached a safe area, there must be immediate communication to ALL personnel that there is an imminent threat in the facility. This may include multiple processes that require an understanding of all the communication tools available in the facility.

In today's threat environment, there are more than three options that can be implemented when faced with an active attacker.

Example 1: During an active shooter drill at a Kenyan mining facility, there were 16 miners involved in a particular test. The moderator of the drill asked if they all had the number for the 24/7 security command center at base camp. All 16 miners raised their hands. The moderator asked one miner to call the number to see if the center would answer. The miner immediately indicated that he could not because he did not have minutes on his phone. The moderator asked how many of the 16 did not have minutes on their phone and 14 raised their hands. This became a critical issue with regard to communicating a potential threat at the mining facility. After a moment, one miner raised his hand and asked if he could make a suggestion. He brought up the fact that, if the security command center had a toll-free number, they would be able to call regardless of the number of minutes on their phones.

Example 2: Hospitals typically utilize "Code Silver" to describe that an active shooter (and sometimes hostage) is in or near the facility. The issue with coded language is that many people do not remember what the code means. Especially in the case of an imminent threat, there is little reason not to use plain text language so that all personnel can immediately understand that there is danger.

Control

Any delay of an attacker's movement allows more time for emergency responders to arrive on scene. A complete understanding of the mechanisms available to delay an attacker is critical.

Example: During an active shooter drill at a corporate headquarters, the conversation turned to potential control mechanisms in the facility. The moderator brought in the building engineer to discuss possible options to delay an attacker. After 30 minutes of discussion on lockdown processes, the moderator was about to wrap up the exercise when he noticed large openings near the elevator bank. The moderator was told that they were fire gates that could be immediately dropped to block the entire bank of elevators. When asked why

the engineer did not mention this before, the engineer indicated that the gates were not for lockdown, but for fire response. This demonstrated the need to rethink approaches to lockdown procedures and how these processes can possibly delay an attacker.

Training Style Matters

Safety, communication, and control are the foundation of managing an active attack incident. There are many examples of how focusing on the management of an event rather than individual response can lead to incredible findings on minimizing potential casualties and demonstrating elevated duty of care. It is up to each facility management team to conduct the correct style of drill/training to help identify critical aspects of active shooter policy and procedures that go beyond running, hiding, and fighting.

Aric Mutchnick is the president of Experior Group Inc., the company that invented the groundbreaking [Red Ball Drills®](#) active shooter training program. He sits on the board of advisors for the Foundation for Innovation and Discovery (FINND) as well as the board of advisors for Global Source, an international business intelligence company. He also sits on the membership committee for the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA).

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
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Active Shooter School Preparedness: An Update

By Kay C. Goss

Schools, colleges, and universities are diverse communities that present especially challenging situations. Safety officials know that they have to be extremely well prepared for a vast array of potentially difficult situations that can spiral. Fortunately, many resources exist to help communities prepare for such dangerous scenarios.



Since the mass killings at Columbine High School (Colorado) in 1999 and at Virginia Tech in 2007, federal, state, tribal, and local officials from around the country have made significant efforts on planning, training, and exercises, as well as technologies and standards, to strengthen preparedness for these devastating attacks. Federal agencies, along with campus safety leaders, state, tribal, and local officials have focused significant time in preparing for this special potential crisis.

Active Shooter Online Training

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has a one-hour online course ([IS-907 Active Shooter: What You Can Do](#)) that provides an introductory lesson on the actions that may be taken when confronted by an active shooter, as well as indicators of workplace violence and how to manage the consequences of an incident. This course describes actions to take to prevent and prepare for potential active shooter incidents, ways to recognize potential workplace violence indicators, actions to take when confronted with an active shooter and responding law enforcement officials, and ways to manage the consequences of an active shooter incident.

FEMA – in partnership with the U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Counter Terrorism Center, and other partners – conducts active shooter and mass casualty event training through FEMA's Joint Counter-Terrorism Awareness Workshop Series. FEMA's whole of community emphasis has been deployed in this scenario as in other disasters with the following stakeholders: individuals, families, and households; the private and nonprofit sectors; faith-based organizations; and local, schools, colleges, universities, state, tribal, territorial, and federal governments.

To keep schools and their occupants safe, the federal government offers a wealth of resources and tools to local communities.



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Strategic & Tactical Training

The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center ([FLETC](#)) held a national summit, in a number of locations, over the last three years, on preventing multiple casualty violence, focusing on strategic approaches to information sharing. This summit brought together stakeholders from fields such as emergency management, fire service, law enforcement, healthcare, law, social sciences, education, and academia to discuss how to improve the nation's ability to prevent future mass casualty attacks.

In response to the 2012 Newtown (Connecticut) shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School, the FBI sought ways to better protect the lives of responding officers and the innocent people victimized by an active shooter. The FBI partnered with Texas State University (TSU) to update Department of Justice (DOJ) Bureau of Justice Assistance funded tactical training for frontline patrol officers who respond alone, or with one or two others, to an active shooter situation. The FBI then sent 100 of its trainers to TSU train-the-trainer programs, so these agents and their TSU counterparts expanded training on active shooter response tactics nationwide. These instructors provide free and vital training to state and local law enforcement officers, and an additional \$1.1 million in funding provided by the FBI and DOJ significantly increased the number of trained officers.

A couple of years ago, the FBI's 56 field offices hosted newly developed two-day workshops on active shooter situations, which brought together sheriffs, chiefs, and other senior command staff from more than 1,850 state, local, tribal, and campus police agencies. FBI experts and attendees shared lessons learned and best practices, and they discussed available resources when faced with responding to and recovering from active shooter and mass casualty incidents. All 56 FBI field offices nationwide hosted active shooter tabletop exercises to focus on how to respond to and recover from a mass killing incident at an elementary school. More than 2,000 representatives from more than 1,000 agencies participated, including: representatives from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, law enforcement, fire services, and emergency medical services, as well as federal prosecutors and district, county, and state attorneys. FBI offices continue to host these no-cost trainings and table-top exercises.

Critical Incident Resources

The FBI has developed and distributed throughout the year 25,000 copies of a comprehensive critical incident handbook specifically designed for state, local, campus, and tribal law enforcement. The handbook, and an accompanying on-scene commander pocket guide, provides essential checklists, resources, and guidance for on-scene commanders responding to events including active shooter and mass casualty incidents.

Effectively working with the media is a critical part of emergency management. The FBI developed and distributed 25,000 new crisis communications quick reference guides. These pocket guides, which are being distributed to state, local, campus, and tribal law enforcement, provide easy-to-follow guidance on how to prepare to handle a national media event, a checklist to follow, and guidance on how to coordinate with unified command, manage press conferences, and deal with social media.

The FBI has an [active shooter web page](#), housing information on best practices, lessons learned, and resources on active shooter situations. The FBI has an active shooter location on “Law Enforcement Online,” a secured site that allows law enforcement agencies to share resources and speak to each other during ongoing events and investigations via a virtual command center.

Expanded Outreach & Preparedness Tools

Since Newtown, the FBI – in partnership with FEMA, state, local, tribal, and campus law enforcement agencies – has hosted hundreds of meetings, exercises, and presentations with citizen groups, private industry, and educational groups. These events have focused on best practices and lessons learned from the 2013 response to the Boston Marathon bombing as well as the following 2012 active shooter incidents: school shooting in Newtown; theater shooting in Aurora, Colorado; and Sikh Temple shooting in Oak Creek, Wisconsin.

In addition, the FBI maintains a database of all active shooter scenarios since 2000, now containing 27 pages of descriptions of more than 200 such incidents. The FBI’s Hazardous Devices School at Redstone Arsenal deals with working on preparedness for such events, with working groups addressing the agency’s emergency response and domestic preparedness.

The National Association of School Principals is significantly engaged in awareness and preparedness activities as well. Many private companies offer preparedness training, using these active shooter scenarios for their format.

The newest nonprofit addition to these preparedness tools, the Points of Light Foundation, founded by former President George H. W. Bush, offering an opportunity for nonprofit, community, and faith-based organizations to participate in an internet-based exercise entitled “[Workplace Down – An Active Shooter Exercise](#).” This free tabletop exercise was held

on Thursday, 29 September 2016, and provided an opportunity to work through scenario information and injects dealing with an active shooter within the office (see Table 1).

Table 1. Resource links for “Workplace Down – An Active Shooter Exercise.”

University	Active Shooter Response Exercise Active Shooter Consequence Management Exercise
Hospital	Active Shooter Response Exercise Active Shooter Consequence Management Exercise
School (K-12)	Active Shooter Response Exercise Active Shooter Consequence Management Exercise
Workplace	Active Shooter Response Exercise Active Shooter Consequence Management Exercise

Finally, FEMA has a new [instructive piece](#) available online for steps to take: (a) before an active shooter incident to prepare; (b) during such an event to stay safe; and (c) after such an event to recover.

In summary, progress has been made, but no one is completely satisfied with the current status of active shooter preparedness. Improvements are being made every day as hard work continues to focus on safety of children, students, faculty, and administrators at schools, colleges, and universities, as well as all governmental jurisdictions and many private and nonprofit sector leaders.

Note: This is a subject of personal as well as professional concern. The author’s grandson found himself and his academic advisor in the midst of strategizing in an attempt to keep their classroom safe during the Virginia Tech shooting incident in 2007, while the attacker was able to shoot his way into the classroom, slaying several students and his professor.

Kay C. Goss, CEM®, is president of World Disaster Management, U.S. President of The International Emergency Management Society, and part-time faculty at University of Nevada at Las Vegas and Metropolitan College of New York. Previous positions include: executive in residence at the University of Arkansas, senior principal and director of emergency management and continuity programs at SRA International (2007-2011); senior advisor of emergency management, homeland security, and business security at Electronic Data Systems (2001-2007); associate Federal Emergency Management Agency director in charge of national preparedness, training, and exercises, appointed by President William Jefferson Clinton (1993-2001); senior assistant to the governor for intergovernmental relations, Governor William Jefferson Clinton (1982-1993); chief deputy state auditor at the Arkansas State Capitol (1981-1982); project director at the Association of Arkansas Counties (1979-1981); research director at the Arkansas State Constitutional Convention, Arkansas State Capitol (1979); project director of the Educational Finance Study Commission, Arkansas General Assembly, Arkansas State Capitol (1977-1979).

Cambridge Police Introduce First-of-Its-Kind Trauma Training for Officers

By Paul Ames

On 7 June 2016, the Cambridge (Massachusetts) Police Department conducted a law enforcement officer training at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to help bridge the understanding gap between officers and the citizens they serve. The training included more than 20 Cambridge career police officers and more than 15 representatives from collaborating local service providers.



Everyone in the room knew that policing is not an easy profession, but retired Lieutenant Richard Goerling of the Hillsboro, Oregon, Police Department reinforced that notion during the training with a profound statistic: the average police officer loses seven years of his or her life just by becoming an officer. That startling statistic set the stage for an intensive five-day Trauma Informed Law Enforcement Training Program that was spearheaded by retired Commissioner Robert Haas, current Commissioner Christopher Burke, Deputy Superintendent Paul Ames, Elizabeth Speakman (executive director of the Cambridge Domestic and Gender-Based Violence Prevention Initiative), Catherine Pemberton (social worker at the Cambridge Police Department), Jacquelyn Rose (director of outreach and programs at the Cambridge Police Department), and Alyssa Donovan (domestic violence liaison for the Cambridge Police Department).

Inward Reflection

As Commissioner Burke stated at the outset of the training, “An officer may experience more trauma in the course of an incident or several incidents than an individual may experience over the course of his or her lifetime. While it’s important to understand trauma as it relates to a victim, it’s just as important to help officers understand and manage their own trauma.”

Each of the five days started with a 5- to 20-minute mindfulness exercise. Admittedly, the practice was uncomfortable for many in the room, as some had yet to participate in a meditation session or “body scan,” a systematic concentration and awareness of parts of the body to further relaxation and awareness. However, as the days proceeded, and the participants became more comfortable with each other and the facilitators, anxieties subsided and officers benefitted from each practice.

Goerling stated, “Officers need to be equipped with skills in order to succeed as it relates to their well-being.” Later in the training, it was noted that when flying on an airplane, the flight attendant instructs passengers to put their oxygen masks on first, before helping others. This sentiment was echoed throughout the trauma training to ensure that the officers recognized that if they cannot or are not taking care of themselves, they will not be able to take care of others.

External Interaction

The second half of the training emphasized being healthy, compassionate, and understanding, while recognizing how everyone suffers trauma, albeit not necessarily in

the same way. In addition to Goerling, the following nationally regarded subject matter experts led trauma-informed sessions:

- **Erin Miller**, *MPS, MDV, CTSS, CASAC-T, and Manager of the Domestic Violence/ Sexual Assault Program, Newton-Wellesley Hospital*
- **Jim Hopper**, *Ph.D., Independent Consultant, Part-Time Instructor, Harvard Medical School*
- **Donna Kelly**, *Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence Prosecutor, Utah Prosecution Council*
- **Justin Boardman**, *Detective, West Valley City Police Department (Utah)*
- **Nicole Del Castillo**, *MD, MPH*

Miller's presentation highlighted the varying degrees of trauma (war, death, prolonged abuse, neglect), how people are affected, and how they process trauma in the short and long term. She noted that a single incident could be life altering, with adverse childhood experiences having life-long impacts. Miller also discussed the cumulative impact of trauma and the analogy of every traumatic experience being like a "brick" one carries, with only so many bricks people can carry at a time. Officers were encouraged to keep that perspective in mind to help provide a deeper sense of compassion for victims and themselves.

Hopper emphasized the science behind the brain – trauma and various triggers that prompt trauma following a sexual assault experience. Along with extensive research and data, he provided case studies and videos to broaden the officers' perspectives. For example, he discussed the fear circuitries at work during a sexual assault and how disassociated a victim can become.

Kelly and Boardman complemented Hopper and shared how and why sexual assault cases are treated differently than any other crime: the national average of successfully prosecuted sexual assault cases is between 9 and 15 percent. From an investigative standpoint, Kelly and Boardman each highlighted that, with trauma, a victim will not necessarily recall events in order, but will remember the details most associated with survival – emotions or sensations. As a result, officers were encouraged to ask open-ended questions focusing on detail elements such as the type of furniture in a room, lighting, and sounds, as well as to provide a safe and comfortable environment to discuss non-leading questions.

Boardman likened an ideal interview process with a sexual assault victim to viewing a whiteboard full of sticky notes and a detective's objective being to remove as many sticky notes as possible and then determine their possible sequences ("What else happened?" versus "What happened next?"). For the first time, many officers participated in various role-playing exercises in which they were the victims. According to one officer, "For the first time, I experienced the other side and noticed the officer's body language and techniques. I also was more aware of how empathetic and judgmental they were (or weren't)." Boardman concluded his session by saying, "Over time, these (sexual assault case) interviews are heavy and will wear on you. Self-care is absolutely critical."

Nicole Del Castillo's presentation centered on the trauma created by caregiver removal and realization of the impact this would have, particularly on children. First, police can modify procedures to make the arrest less traumatic. Second, police can adopt protocols to ensure that children are accounted for, left with competent caregivers and protected from harm. Third, police can collaborate with social workers and child advocates to connect children of arrested parents with the services they need.

At the conclusion of the training, officers and participants debriefed and acknowledged how this radical and cutting-edge training would help bring the department to a new area, particularly with trauma and resilience. One of the trainers stated, “You guys are extremely progressive . . . nobody has gotten to this point.” Overall, 21 officers graduated from this inaugural Trauma-Informed Training, which according to one, “took away my own skepticism, bias, and helped me be more compassionate.” Another said that, “If this can save one officer’s life, then this program will be a success.” It certainly helped build a broader foundation that the Cambridge Police Department will use going forward, roll out to all of its officers, and help evolve the culture into one that is even more compassionate and resilient.

Deputy Superintendent Paul Ames is the commanding officer of the Professional Standards Unit and Academy of the Cambridge Massachusetts Police Department. He is the control chief for a newly formed regional Critical Incident Stress Management Team involving eight local departments. From 2010 to May 2015, he commanded the Investigations Section, which includes Criminal Investigations, Family Justice Unit (domestic violence, sexual assault, and sex offender registry), Special Investigations Unit, Crime Scene Services (crime scene processing and fingerprint classification), Crime Analysis Unit, Electronic Crimes Task Force, and four detectives assigned to federal agency task forces. Additionally he was the commanding officer of a 20-member Special Response Team and 80-member Tactical Patrol Force. In this role, he planned and implemented active shooter drills in business/healthcare environments, participated in homeland security planning including Urban Shield Boston, dignitary visits, public events, and festivals from the 2004 Democratic National Convention to the July 4 activities, and assisted with security planning for business communities (including biotech firms) and universities in the City of Cambridge.

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


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Protecting Civil Liberties for Suspicious Activity Reports

By Jerome H. Kahan

In the United States, First Amendment rights protect the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of citizens. However, in the absence of legal requirements for establishing prior probable cause or reasonable suspicion when reporting suspicious behavior, questions arise about the degree to which the [suspicious activity reporting](#), [Nationwide SAR Initiative](#), and [Information Sharing Environment \(SAR-NSI-ISE\)](#) process safeguards those making reports.



To address this issue, the program manager for the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) developed a comprehensive [Privacy Protection Framework](#) in July 2010 that must be adopted by any agency before it is allowed to post or access SARs. Participants in the process must adhere to standardized vetting, which “emphasizes a behavior-focused approach,” and identifies types of observed behavior that may be “reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism,” thus “mitigating the risk of ‘profiling’ based upon race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, etc.”

Notwithstanding these efforts, serious privacy issues continue to plague the NSI-SAR system from its inception. [News articles in 2010](#) explained that this nationwide domestic surveillance effort, “collects, stores and analyzes information about thousands of U.S. citizens and residents,” who have been identified as “acting suspiciously,” without adjudication, evidence, or reasonable suspicion that any wrongdoing had been committed. On 10 July 2014, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a [lawsuit](#) on behalf of citizens identified in SARs, arguing that this program violates First Amendment-protected activities. In seeking to counter government moves for dismissal, the ACLU also argued that guidelines governing the program are at odds with the Department of Justice’s [official standard](#), which prohibits “the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination” of terrorist-related intelligence information, unless there is reasonable suspicion of potentially prosecutable activities. It is not clear that any changes were made to the SAR program “despite repeated calls from a [coalition of civil rights and other organizations](#).”

The Effectiveness of SAR

In an effort to assess the value of the SAR system, in April 2015, The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism ([START](#)) completed a study that sought to validate the effectiveness of the 16 ISE-SAR preoperational planning behaviors put forth by the latest [Functional Standard](#) that “describes the structure, content, and products associated with processing, integrating, and retrieving . . . SARs by ISE participants.” After examining 48 cases by employing an elaborate methodology and extensive data, the study concluded that many of these indicators were in fact observed and reported, causing law enforcement officials to intercept terrorist planning before violent activities occurred.

In addition, the study noted many missed opportunities in situations when relatively clear indicators of preoperational planning related to terrorism were never reported and thus could not be acted upon. Relatives, friends, and work colleagues might notice a person's strange behavior, such as a recent penchant for violence, purchase of assault-type weapons, an interest in converting to Islam, or trips to the Middle East, but fail to report their suspicions to authorities for reasons including concerns over protecting familial ties, fear of being associated with



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a violent act, or lack of trust in law enforcement. What was not mentioned were the many situations where there were no potentially observable indicators of a violent extremist act, such as someone becoming self-radicalized by sitting in front of a computer and reading terrorist propaganda or in other unnoticeable ways, and then committing a “lone wolf” terrorist act.

A 2011 Congressional Research Service (CRS) [report](#), “Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative,” stressed the need to determine how well the SAR campaign is working by developing “metrics to measure the success of the NSI program.” This issue was underscored in 2013 when the Federal Bureau of Investigation was faulted by the Government Accountability Office ([GAO](#)) for not tracking whether SARs inserted into the NSI actually helped to thwart terrorism by leading to arrests and convictions or had no value whatsoever. This GAO [investigation](#) also “found that the SAR program had failed to demonstrate any arrests, convictions, or thwarted threats, even though tens of thousands of SARs have been uploaded to government databases.” The result was that the program has been ineffective while threatening the legal privacy protections of the people mentioned in the reports and never giving the public an opportunity to comment on this governmental effort.

In general, ordinary citizens have difficulty determining the types of behavior manifested by actual terrorists or violent extremists planning an attack or radicalizing someone else. Critics point to the fact that too many SARs have ended up in the ISE when observed individuals have been merely conducting innocuous activities – for example, looking through binoculars to view beautiful scenery, using smartphones to take pictures of their families, or just wearing unusual clothing. The result has been an ever-expanding array of information stored in the SAR-ISE about people who have done nothing wrong, thus flooding this database with meaningless or distracting material. These developments have led to a high rate of false alarms with innocent people being arrested, peaceful facilities being evacuated, and hundreds of police hours being wasted on invalidated claims.

The CRS report mentioned above, noting the vast amount of information being entered into the ISE, observed that it has become more difficult for federal analysts to “‘connect the dots’ . . . when there is an increasingly large volume of ‘dots’ to sift through and analyze,” which could lead to “‘pipe clogging’ as huge amounts of information are . . . gathered without apparent focus.”

However, this might be less of a problem, according to a [2010 article](#) by Dr. James E. Steiner, a public service professor at Rockefeller College, entitled “More Is Better: The Analytic Case for a Robust Suspicious Activity Reports Program,” because “the probability of any single SAR being an indicator of an actual terrorist plot is so small that it is insignificant. But the greater the number of SAR[s], the greater the overall probability that at least a few real indicators of threat exist within the total body of SAR reporting.” On balance, the SAR-NSI-ISE process does not seem to be working efficiently or effectively, lacks the means to accurately measure its value, and risks being smothered in a sea of information, thus becoming broken and useless unless improvements can be made.

The Future of SAR

In articles with provocative titles such as “[New Study Proves Your Neighbors Are Spying on You](#),” critics have termed the SAR program “[a vast domestic intelligence apparatus to collect information about Americans](#).” In September 2010, the national security editor for the *Guardian*, Spencer Ackerman, pointed to “a handy pamphlet prepared by federal law”

that he called a “[Feds’ Guide To Snitching on Your Terrorist Neighbor](#).”

Ackerman went on to explain that the guide contained warnings by the government that anyone’s next door neighbor could be a terrorist and to look for “behavior that could indicate participation in surveillance of potential targets” or help by reviewing

“websites and reading materials that advocate violence and then initiating action in support of this activity.” This was no joke, but a [real brochure](#), entitled “Identifying Homegrown Violent Extremists Before They Strike: An Information Needs Review,” published on 21 September 2010 by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) – along with a special spy-class designed for easy and accurate neighborhood snitching and snooping!

Notwithstanding the urge to poke fun at some aspects of the government’s strategy to deal with violent extremism, this danger is on the rise and the SAR-NSI-ISE regime remains a useful if not essential tool for dealing with this threat, but with a need for improvement. This means that federal agencies should continue to tone down their rhetoric, not state the obvious, and urge citizens to contact authorities if and only if they see something genuinely suspicious happening in their neighborhoods. This can help lower the numbers of false alarms that contribute to the overflow of information in the ISE, hampering officials from

Seeing something and saying something when evidence of wrongdoing is lacking can create public distrust and expend unnecessary resources.

accessing the system for information leading to interventions that can stop violent actions before damage is done.

There also needs to be a streamlining of the system to more accurately identify suspicious behaviors leading to appropriate interventions before acts of violence occur, those that reflect possible leads to be kept for potential future use, and information that should be discarded as having nothing to do with violent extremism. Standardized SAR training should be provided for law enforcement officers as well as interested citizens, with the focus on striking a balance between being too aggressive and being overly cautious in what to look for and what to report, while continuing to protect First Amendment rights. A model for improvement at the local level is the policy adopted by the Los Angeles Police Department ([LAPD](#)) to ensure that, in seeking to identify terrorists, its SAR program, “doesn’t cast suspicion on individuals whose only ‘offense’ is to exercise their right to free speech or belong to a particular ethnic or religious group.”

Given recent incidents across the nation of violent behavior with terrorist influences, the program manager for the ISE should take steps to enhance information sharing on suspicious individuals among law enforcement officers and [fusion centers](#). In addition, all relevant entities should not only enter data on domestic extremists with radical tendencies into the ISE, but also send this information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for placement into the [Terrorist Watch List](#).

It is useful for citizens to pay more attention to observing other citizens in an effort to spot and report suspicious activities related to violent extremism, as long as this does not cause men and women going on a stroll or shopkeepers along the way to stare at passers-by or customers with their notepads deployed ready to report suspicious behavior to government authorities. Lovers of liberty are justifiably concerned when the federal government, in the name of national security, posts signs advertising SAR everywhere, ensures that [If You See Something, Say Something™](#) appears on the nightly news, and induces internet pop-up reminders for users to always be on the watch. In this connection, a December 2010 *Washington Post* article, called [Big Brother USA: Monitoring America](#), explained that the FBI is “building a database with the names and certain personal information, such as employment history, of thousands of U.S. citizens and residents whom a local police officer or a fellow citizen believed to be acting suspiciously . . . many of whom have not been accused of any wrongdoing.”

More than five years later, the ACLU and other civil rights groups are still fighting to prevent the SAR program from developing a life of its own and challenging the freedom of Americans – but to no avail. Without any change, citizens may soon find themselves in an [Orwellian world](#) where “big brother is watching you” becomes reality and not fiction.

Jerome H. Kahan is an independent analyst with over 40 years of experience on national and homeland security issues, including senior positions in the Foreign Service, the Brookings Institution, and the Homeland Security Institute. In addition to his publications, he has been an adjunct professor in the graduate school at Georgetown University and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, with BS and MS degrees from Columbia University.

The “Not If, But When” Fallacy: Active Shooter Preparedness

By Research Group at University of Maryland

The phrase “It’s not if, but when” may distort how certain organizations perceive emergency preparedness, especially in cases such as active shooter threats. This common expression leads to inaccurate threat perceptions and can result in leaders becoming complacent. Emergency managers should be aware of this potential odd pairing of a sense of inevitability with complacency, and be prepared to counter it.

Many places (including Ft. Hood in Texas; University of California-Santa Barbara; Charleston, South Carolina; San Bernardino, California; Orlando, Florida; Virginia Tech; Aurora, Colorado; Columbine High School in Colorado; Sandy Hook Elementary School in Connecticut) are now associated with one of the most horrific kinds of criminals imaginable: the active shooter. Not only are these incidents terrible, but their frequency, by all accounts, is increasing. In fact, active shooter incidents are inevitable, with incidents occurring in the United States for at least 100 years.

However, no particular person or occupational role – an emergency manager, a business owner, or a school principal – is guaranteed to experience one of these incidents at his or her particular jurisdiction, business, or school. In some organizations, though – particularly colleges and universities – leadership has interpreted the constant media coverage of active shooter incidents as a direct indication that their institutions will inevitably face an active shooter. Their perspective essentially states that it is a matter of “not if, but when.”

Origins of the Phrase: “Not If, But When”

One of the earliest recorded uses in the English language of the phrase “It’s not if, but when,” or a related derivative, comes from an 1867 English periodical referencing an Italian politician. Recent American usage of the phrase has often involved describing the inevitability of minor or major disasters, such as [cyberattacks](#), [identity theft](#), [terrorism](#), [communicable disease outbreaks](#), and negative impacts of [climate change](#).

Usage in a subdiscipline of public relations known as crisis management is also quite common. Experts and authors in crisis management, often writing from a corporate perspective, emphasize the importance of being prepared to communicate after an incident that has affected the reputation of an organization. The goal is to counter negative media coverage and ensure that employees and the public maintain as positive an opinion of the organization as possible.

Crisis managers may say, “It’s not if, but when,” when they believe that an organization is going to experience one of these reputational crises. There is a chance that any organization will face some sort of crisis at some point in the future. However, it is possible that some leaders have wrongfully conflated the inevitability of simply anything in an organization going awry alongside the active shooter incident, with its much lower likelihood.

Frequency of Active Shooter Incidents

Understanding the frequency of active shooter incidents must begin with an understanding of related definitions. This article employs three definitions to establish frequency:

- [Active shooter](#): “an individual or individuals actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area.”
- [Mass shooting](#): “a multiple homicide incident in which four or more victims are murdered with firearms, within one event, and in one or more locations in close proximity.”
- [Targeted violence](#): “an incident of violence where a known or knowable attacker selects a particular target prior to their violent attack.”

The definitions above include both incidents when individuals attempted violent acts as well as events that resulted in fatalities. According to the Congressional Research Service ([CRS](#)), a shooting is only considered a “mass shooting” if it results in at least four deaths. This definition aligns with what much of the public thinks when confronted with the term “active shooter” and thus blurs the lines between incidents where a shooter attempts acts of violence, and “mass shooting” events where multiple fatalities occur. Using the CRS’s definition, the United States had fewer than three such incidents per year from [1983 to 2012](#). By the same definition, [2014 and 2015](#) saw eight mass shootings.

Catchphrases can be misleading, even when well intentioned. Since inevitability could lead to complacency, leaders must choose their words wisely.

Alternately, *targeted school violence* – an incident of violence where a known or knowable attacker selects a particular target prior to a violent attack – increased from fewer than 10 per year in the first half of the 20th century, to close to 100 per year by 2008, according to a 2014 presentation by former chief research psychologist for the U.S. Secret Service, Dr. Marisa Randazzo, as part of [threat assessment training](#) through Sigma Threat Management Associates. Although this statistic is disturbing, Randazzo urges people to take into account the similarly rising student enrollment rates across the United States in the same period. Indeed, the increase in frequency, when observed in isolation, is alarming. But when placed into context among a commonplace rise in population, the frequency may represent a stable phenomenon, according to Randazzo.

It appears that what is lacking in the public’s perspective is context. Federal Bureau of Investigation [research](#) indicates that active shooter incidents in the entire United States have been increasing in frequency, from an average of 6.4 incidents per year between 2000 and 2006 to an average of 16.4 incidents per year from 2007 to 2013. Despite these national averages suggesting a low probability of an incident occurring at any particular location, some leaders still believe these events to be inevitable.

The Psychology

Extensive media coverage of school shootings makes such incidents particularly salient, which may lead to a pervasive public misconception of their frequency. This reliance on easily recalled examples to support decision-making is called the [availability heuristic](#). When concepts are more cognitively available, they are assumed to be statistically more likely than they truly are.

This bias can lead to a phenomenon in behavioral psychology known as [learned helplessness](#), which is a condition of powerlessness observed both in humans and animals when a particular trauma or threat seems unavoidable. The perceived inevitability for recurrence of such threats leads to predictable behaviors that demonstrate feelings of helplessness or complacency.

Exposure to seemingly uncontrollable events not only alters the individual's ability to see relationships between behaviors and their outcomes, but it can also have a greater [emotional impact](#) than that of controllable events. The availability heuristic leads to systematic biases, particularly with regard to repeated events. In context, this likely manifests as overestimations of the probability of an active shooter incident occurring based on the salience of recent prominent examples. If that overestimation results in a belief of inevitability, learned helplessness becomes a possible threat.

The Danger of Catchphrases

Leaders lead, in part, by creating meaning for their followers. It is natural, then, that even good leaders are drawn to catchphrases that seem to encompass important points. Though certainly well intentioned, the phrase, "It's not if, but when," is ultimately fallacious when referring to the likelihood of an active shooter incident occurring at any particular location. This misuse of the phrase probably arises from extensive media coverage of public shootings, especially at schools. Ironically, the incorrect belief of inevitability can lead to complacency, rather than vigilance. It is essential that leaders choose their words wisely. Prevention and survivorship elements of an active shooter program must be backed by organized and balanced leadership, or their implementation could become haphazard and ineffective.

This article was written as a collaborative effort by the following authors:

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Saving Lives With Gunshot Technology

By Edward Jopeck

In June 2016, Orlando, Florida, saw the deadliest shooting in modern U.S. history. Although the shooter was known to law enforcement before the attack that killed 49 and injured more than 50 others, knowledge of extreme views or malevolent intent is often not enough to prevent a future attack months or even years in the future.



Despite best efforts, numerous mass casualty attacks, such as those at Virginia Tech, the Boston Marathon, Century Theater, and the Pulse nightclub have occurred where the attackers were known in advance to the police and mental health professionals. The grim new reality of American life is that many mass shootings and terrorist attacks cannot be prevented in advance. Some attacks – whether driven by mental illness, terrorism, or religious or racial extremism – will always penetrate the law enforcement safety net and arrive at someone’s door. Therefore, the debate rages on about what can be done to reduce the egregious loss of life from these mass shootings. Politicians talk about gun control and what law enforcement can do to identify and disrupt potential threats. Others focus on radicalization and the need for better treatment for those with mental illness, but talk alone is not enough to protect the nation’s people.

Protecting Buildings – From Fires to Shooters

Guns in the wrong hands, terrorism, and severe untreated mental illness are important factors in prevention, and all must be thoroughly addressed. However, planners must not stop there or be content that nothing more can be done. One thing that can have a dramatic impact for reducing the loss of life in such attacks is protective measures for public buildings to make them less attractive targets to shooters and safer environments for their occupants. From the perspective of protecting buildings, clearly there is much more that can be done.

In the 1940s, the United States had some of the worst hotel fires in its history. The Winecoff Hotel fire in Atlanta, Georgia, killed 119 people. The La Salle Hotel fire in Chicago, Illinois, killed 61. And the Canfield Hotel fire in Dubuque, Iowa, killed 19. This spate of deadly fires spurred significant changes in fire safety and North American building codes. President Harry S. Truman led the charge in creating mandates to protect buildings against fire – most significantly requiring multiple protected means of egress and self-closing fire-resistive doors for hotel guest rooms. Smoke detectors, alarms, and sprinkler systems increasingly became the standard safety equipment for public buildings in the 20th century. The number of casualties from non-residential building fires in the United States plummeted as a result. For example, [data collected](#) by the National Fire Protection Association from 1977 to 2015 shows a reduction in non-residential building fires from 370 deaths in 1977, to only 80 in 2015. Just as Truman took measures to protect buildings against fires, innovative leadership should now take measures to protect buildings and their occupants from active shooters.

In the recent attacks in Orlando (Florida), San Bernardino (California), Colorado Springs (Colorado), Paris (France), and countless others, it became apparent that the minutes – even seconds – after the first shot is fired are critical. The sooner law enforcement can be alerted and directed to the shooting location, and the more information they have as they respond, the more lives can be saved. According to the [FBI](#), more than half of all shootings are over before police even arrive. In order to save lives, the victims have to be alerted and have to escape from the shooter’s path faster, and police must have the information to neutralize the threat much sooner.

Technological Solutions

Imagine if first responders and building occupants could all know within a second the location and number of gunshots fired regardless of whether they are several floors away, in the next building, or 20 miles away at a 9-1-1 dispatch center. Police officers could spend all their time focused on responding to the current location of the shooter, while building occupants could spend all of their time evacuating away from danger. Much chaos and confusion could be avoided, and precious minutes would not be lost to the delays and errors that often occur.

The technology already exists to combine gunshot sensors with building security and emergency communication systems to reduce this confusion and provide more timely and accurate information to law enforcement. Like smoke detectors, sprinklers, and other fire safety systems, the technology automates and accelerates 9-1-1 calls and mass notifications to building occupants. As soon as the sensors detect a gunshot, a series of predetermined actions is activated that can improve responses vital to ensuring the safety of both victims and first responders.

Unfortunately, public buildings are vulnerable targets for mass shootings, and thus more desirable targets for shooters and terrorists. When an aspiring assailant seeks to create mass casualties he (or she) will most likely seek a publicly accessible building with many unarmed occupants who can be caught off-guard, kept defenseless, and trapped in a building. At the same time, the shooter is provided a variety of places to move and conceal himself (or herself) from responding police and security forces as long as possible. The result is chaos, confusion, and delays for building occupants, police, and emergency medical personnel – all of which give the shooter significant advantage. However, it does not have to be that way. Better detection and response to this growing threat would save lives for decades to come. Although training and methods to prevent attacks – however imperfect – are important, a more balanced approach involving building protection and response technology is needed to safeguard people when those measures fail.

Edward Jopeck is a leader in addressing the growing need for indoor gunshot detection technology to better respond to mass shootings and terrorist attacks using firearms. As a security risk management expert at Battelle, he uses his experience from over 30 years in security and intelligence to oversee the SiteGuard Active Shooter Response program, where he employs his unique knowledge of gunshot detection technology for protecting people and places. Formerly a security risk analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), he helped create the CIA’s Threat Management Unit and the CIA’s Analytical Risk Management program, which was awarded a National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citation. After the CIA shooting in 1993, he conducted a major study of the threat to government facilities and use of threatening communications to prevent them.

Preparedness Perspective – Active Shooters & Lone Wolves

By Thomas J. Lockwood & Peter LaPorte

Various drills and exercises highlight efforts to protect communities against various types of attacks involving transportation, buildings, historic sites, sporting events, and so on. Attacks and hostage-taking incidents around the world expose vulnerabilities that need to be assessed in all communities to determine: what they need to drill, who they need to train, and how they will collaborate across jurisdictions.



Regardless of the weapon used, active shooter situations are dynamic and evolve quickly. An individual or multiple attackers are actively killing or attempting to kill innocent people. Frequently incidents are over before arrival of law enforcement, forcing individuals to be prepared both mentally and physically to deal with an active shooter situation prior to law enforcement arrival. In other cases, only the immediate deployment of law enforcement can stop the shooter to mitigate harm to potential victims.

This paper shares key observations and issues from drills, exercises, and trends influencing preparedness strategies for active shooters and evolving threats. Venues discussed include: jurisdictional and inter-jurisdictional response; special events, including amusement parks and professional sporting events; and coordination with the private sector, including commercial and retail property managers.

Drills & Exercises to Identify & Close Gaps

Imagine an active shooter exercise at a regional light-rail station near a city and county border. About five minutes before the start of the exercise, a sergeant, a lieutenant, and a senior patrol officer are huddling. They realize they never met before, but more importantly, the three jurisdictions never compared entry policies, which it turns out are all different. In this amazing pre-event moment, professionals realize they need to get their response units together for inter-jurisdictional planning. Later during the exercise, there is a simulated shooting with an officer down. The effect of the “shooting” and lack of common response causes hesitation and costs time. The “shooter” uses that hesitation and delay to cleanly get away. For the next several hours, responders search but never find the shooter (until the after-action hotwash).

This simple exercise was real and serves as an introductory example of the value of exercises. Professionals of various experiences and perspectives are pressed within an exercise scenario representative of what they might experience in real life, to find uncertainties or

inconsistencies that create operational pause or hesitation. That pause in decision-making and action – to consider the “right decision” versus alternatives across conflicting policies, plans, procedures, and assumptions – can cost lives.

It is critical to learn and apply insights from real-world events. Following the response to the 2013 Washington Navy Yard shootings, the public safety community actively addressed shortfalls, practiced drills, and exercised various scenarios to enhance response. As a result, the Metropolitan Police Department’s (MPD) response to the 2015 Washington Navy Yard lockdown was significantly enhanced. MPD had more weapons, enhanced capabilities on

the street, and changes in tactics and procedures that resulted in a much faster and more effective response force.

Closing the gaps in evolving threat environments can be accomplished through collaboration and inclusiveness in drills, exercises, and coordination activities.

Following a series of school shootings, extensive focus and efforts were applied to the safety of schools and community facilities. Law

enforcement and public safety communities actively collaborated with schools to enhance safety including resiliency measures, coordination procedures, and lockdown strategies. Since that time, tools and resources continue to evolve and changes in key personnel have occurred. It is easy to become complacent. Drills and exercises leveraging new technologies and tools offer opportunities for continued collaboration between public safety and schools to support renewal and help achieve the next level of preparedness.

Special Events Planning

Moving beyond scenarios within daily activities, special events including entertainment, amusement parks, and professional sporting events provide significantly increased challenges. Magnets for large crowds, these types of venues present challenges on multiple levels, including: the role of private sector decision-makers and stakeholders; the need to quickly identify and apprehend or end the threat; and the scalability of response planning and capabilities.

The sporting, entertainment, and amusement communities and local public safety planners and responders are proactively drilling and exercising. For example, a recent lone-wolf exercise at the Six Flags Amusement Park in New Jersey emphasized the parallel use of public and private resources to quickly identify the individual involved. This included leveraging social media to identify people who may pose specific threats, which helps decision makers on the front end in order to make smarter, more rapid, and more effective decisions on the responding end. In this case, the hypothetical employee was identified through human resources as a disgruntled employee. The exercise demonstrated to participants not only

the need for rapid and coordinated collaboration – using private sector resources that are typically unavailable to the public sector – but also how an attacker could be anyone and investigations should not be limited by initial perceptions or outside influencers.

Sporting events provide highly attended, densely populated venues with a complex array of decision-maker, stakeholder, and response challenges. After conducting seven exercises this year with the National Football League, clear patterns arose relating to the need for enhanced understanding of the decision-making process, key decision points, and key decision makers, which can vary between pre-game, during, and post-game as well as incident location (inside or outside the stadium). This process varies throughout the league. For example, some team owners are actively involved in decision-making and are in direct communication with local response officials and departments. For other teams, the local public safety and police are clearly in charge, with team and facility staff in a collaborative, supportive role. Although different teams have different policies, it is essential to know who are the decision makers, understand key decision-making policies for and between private sector and public safety response, and ensure a coordinated response with the public. Conducting drills and exercises is the best way to ensure clarity between decision makers, congruency between policies, and identification of potential gaps.

Communities and regions possess rich historical treasures, which serve as focal points for tourism and special events. For example, millions of visitors pass through Mount Vernon, Virginia, home of George Washington, each year. As a symbolic venue with open access from the river, this location presents unique challenges for defending against an attack. A series of active shooter and evolving threats exercises revealed the need to enhance armed guards, update response plans, and install cameras and other technological enhancements. There was significant concern that implementation of these enhancements be balanced with preserving the heritage of the landmark and not detracting from the visitor experience. To do so, exercises were incrementally expanded to include broader perspectives and solutions to stakeholder concerns, thus influencing both capital investments and response plans.

Collaboration With the Private Sector

The private sector retail, commercial, and industrial facility managers are critical partners, but there are gaps in coordination and inclusion. For example, the private sector typically has strong, coordinated, and ongoing relationships and understanding with the fire community (elevators, lockboxes, occupancy security plans, access-related issues), but significant gaps on these issues exist with the law enforcement community. There is an incorrect assumption that police have similar awareness of this information. A newer trend is to include the local beat or zone patrol law enforcement officers within the fire community interactions and discussions with the private sector as well as the inclusion of the fire community's participation and interaction within community policing strategies.

In response to commercial and retail facility shootings and threats, facility security strategies now include hardening and resiliency measures including access-control enhancement and compartmentalization. Within commercial and retail facilities and campuses, Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) are becoming more automated and intelligent, providing enhancements as well as new challenges. For example, PACS can provide augmented to full-automation capabilities for activation and deactivation of a facility's access and egress points. Other trends include: shot detection and automated response (potentially reducing response times by 60 percent); enhancement of closed-circuit television and control rooms to provide better: situational awareness, local control and override of select PACS, real-time information sharing internally and externally, and redesign and provisioning for dual-use service as a safe room.

However, retail, commercial, and industrial property managers' policies, protocols, and capabilities – including PACS automation – are not consistent among themselves or across corporate facilities and industry sectors. The public safety community has a varying degree of visibility and participation of facility, complex, and campus response plans and protocols. Additionally, there is significant difference between management organizations that focus on “vertical” properties and clusters (city centers, major structures) and those that focus on “horizontal” properties in clusters (malls, outlets). Vertical properties have significant and unique challenges that are still not well understood for integrated response and recovery, including the ability to locate individuals.

Through multiple exercises and roundtable observations, fire, police, emergency medical services, emergency management agencies, and property managers have common and recurring observations: (a) reducing inconsistency of protocols and policies; (b) gaining visibility and enhanced understanding of facility and response plans, including increased information sharing between private and public sector on “as is” operational and tactical information feeds; and (c) enhancing employees' awareness of how to respond within an active shooter event (when an active shooter is in the vicinity, run, hide, fight; and after law enforcement arrives, remain calm, follow instructions, drop any objects, raise hands and spread fingers, keep hands visible, do not ask for help or directions, and do not make quick movements, point, yell, or scream) and “individual response intelligence” (ability/capability of employees/individuals on scene to react and provide positive support following the event and before arrival of first responders).

Resource Strategies

Resources are and will continue to be a challenge. Securing resources is a big part of what makes any organization and its leaders successful. Awareness, availability, and access to resources and funds are a big part of what preparedness leadership must do. It is a leadership responsibility to know how and where to obtain resources, in order to “sell” worthy ideas and

priorities so they are funded, and to be creative and entrepreneurial in securing resources. Drills and exercises require resources.

At a minimum, each organization must have the capability to frame, present, and gain sponsorship of well-written proposals with a clear value proposition and outcome. Inclusiveness and collaboration are key strategies that can be faster and more effective in securing resources. Areas of collaboration commonly include mutual aid and multi-jurisdictional response issues, common critical capabilities and shortfalls, and economic and political risks.

The private sector has tremendous resources that are potentially available; the key is inclusiveness and collaboration. This includes collaboration with neighboring jurisdictions around common goals, partnering with colleges, universities, and not-for-profit organizations, and being inclusive of retail, commercial, and industrial sectors and critical infrastructure strategic risk and leadership priorities. Each of these examples requires taking the time to establish relationships and identify and commit to common goals and outcomes. Further, this approach goes beyond resourcing and will help all to mature and push preparedness to the next level.

Lessons Learned From Attack Scenarios

Collaboration and inclusiveness in drills, exercises, and coordination activities help stakeholders determine best practice policies, processes, and benchmarks of what can be done to prevent attacks, enhance effective response, and be on the forefront of preparedness.

Preparedness is a process that never ends. Exercises and trainings stress response efforts in order to strengthen responses during a live incident. They provide time to reflect on why certain decisions were made, identify other decisions that could have been made, and reinforce or modify plans. Drills cost money and time, but are essential for effective response and resilience. Key lessons learned and recommendations include:

- Do not wait for an exercise or real-life event for local jurisdictions and the private sector to get together to review priorities and concerns, discuss best practices, and harmonize and train those best practices across the jurisdictions within the region.
- Do more than just conduct drills and exercises; strengthen relationships, share policies, and make sure that policies are congruent across organizations, departments, and jurisdictions.
- Press exercises and training. Stress participants and afterward support review and consideration of decisions, alternatives, and improved understanding and decision making to successfully achieve the next stage or outcome.

- Look for areas where policy gaps or alignments will cause operational hesitations or pauses, which could have serious consequences. Identify and prioritize resolution efforts to eliminate causes of operational hesitations or pauses.
- Create an environment of collaboration between public and private stakeholders. The private sector possesses and has access to significant capabilities, resources, and assets from excellent leaders and brilliant people to fiscal, physical, and technological capabilities, many of which can only be realized through collaboration.
- Coordinate with schools to ensure awareness of policies, processes, and technologies being deployed.
- Know how to find and leverage human, financial, and other resources.
- Determine how to be on the forefront of intelligence by leveraging social media, community inclusion, and intelligence on the front end to be smarter in the response and viciously on point, making intelligent and effective decisions.

All stakeholders have a part to play in moving preparedness to the next level. Each community needs to bring together key stakeholders to drill on current policies, procedures, and plans in order to develop concrete recommendations for improvement that can be shared and matured throughout a region. Everyone should seek to push the envelope a little bit. Get excited, it is contagious.

Thomas J. Lockwood (pictured) is an independent consultant and former member of U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) senior leadership team and served three of its secretaries in key leadership roles. He supported the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator in efforts to secure online transactions as lead coordinator and core team member for development of the U.S. National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace. He served as the DHS director for the National Capital Region, the homeland security advisor and deputy director of homeland security for the State of Maryland, and the executive deputy commissioner for homeland security and emergency services for the State of New York. He has experience both in the public and private sectors – including the transportation, chemical, pharmaceutical, and food sectors. He is currently a board member of the Smart Card Alliance and a member of its Executive Leadership Council, a member of the Preparedness Leadership Council, and a DomPrep advisor.

Peter LaPorte is an independent consultant in homeland security, emergency management, with a focus on risk and vulnerability assessment. He is a recognized leader in the emergency management field, with over 25 years of successful public safety executive experience within state and local governments. He served in multiple senior executive posts including: executive director of two state emergency management agencies, emergency management director for one of the largest public transit systems in the country, and New York City deputy police commissioner, the largest police department in the United States. He is professionally recognized for development and implementation of innovative and effective policies and programs. He has vast experience in creative problem-solving methods, crisis management, continuity of operations, strategic legislative and media outreach, and communications. He has coordinated six presidential-declared disasters, including floods, Hurricane Isabel (the most expensive disaster in Washington, D.C., history) and the District's responses to the 9/11 events and the anthrax incident one month later. He also implemented a community-based emergency management program in 39 neighborhoods of the city.

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